Inadvertent Cooperation in a G-minus World
Published:
What is optimal economic statecraft for Third Nations, i.e., those not frontline in geopolitical rivalry? Many in Southeast Asia and elsewhere see need for such strategies, not least to keep from becoming collateral damage in someone else’s conflict. Depending on the elasticity of world order with respect to small-state agency, Third Nations can choose to align, acquiesce, or mitigate. This paper describes circumstances where each of these alternatively might be the preferred strategy. Mitigation is historically least considered of the three. Thus, this paper further develops policies of pathfinder multilateralism, in particular inadvertent cooperation, appropriate for mitigation. World order in this case is neither G2 nor G-zero, but G-minus.
Recommended citation: Quah, Danny. 2025. "Inadvertent Cooperation in a G-minus World" LKYSPP Working Paper (Nov)
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